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CHA.PTERll 
Trends in Public Opinion, 
1989-1996 
- John M. Scheb IL William Lyons, and Grant W Neeley 
He who writes of the state, of law, or of politics without first coming to 
close quarters with public opinion is simply evading the very central 
structure of his study. 
-Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (1903) 
INTRODUCTION 
''public opinion" consists of the measurable values, beliefs, attitudes, and 
opinions of the mass public. Nearly all political scientists, following 
Arthur Bentley, recognize the importance of public opinion in politics 
and the policy process. 1 While it is true that much of the stuff of public opinion 
is unstable or even ephemeral, some elements of public opinion not only endure 
but also reveal political preferences and behavior. Certainly, party identification 
and ideological self-identification are examples of reasonably stable attitudes that 
are linked both to issue positions and to candidate evaluation.2 Party identifica-
tion has long been recognized as the main long-term force underlying voters' 
positions on policy issues and ultimately influencing their decisions in the voting 
booth. Ideological self-identification, while somewhat more changeable than 
party identification, is also a relatively stable, enduring political force that is like-
wise linked to issue positions and voting behavior.3 
In this chapter, we examine the party identifications and ideological orien-
tations of Tennesseans from 1989 through 1996, as revealed through survey 
research. We also look at Tennesseans' positions on several issues of public pol-
icy that have been salient in state politics during this period. Our intent is to iso-
late any trends in the partisan and ideological character of the state while exam-
ining citizens' positions on key issues. 
The data upon which this chapter is based are derived from the Tennessee 
Poll, a statewide survey of adults conducted periodically by the Social Science 
Research Institute (SSRI) at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. The first 
Tennessee Poll was taken in April 1989; we have used surveys conducted through 
October 1996. During these eight years, SSRI conducted fifteen installments of 
the Tennessee Poll, from one to three polls per year, depending on the frequency 
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of important or controversial issues. In every instance, respondents were inter-
viewed by telephone and selected by random-digit dialing. Sample sizes varied 
slightly, but with the exception of the 1994 survey (n=694) and the Fall 1996 sur-
vey (n=665), the sample size exceeded 800 respondents .4 In all editions of the 
Tennessee Poll, the demographics were such that we can be confident that the 
samples are representative of the adult population of the State. 
Over the years the Tennessee Poll has attempted to gauge public opinion on 
a variety of issues, ranging from people's perceptions of Elvis Presley after his 
death to their predictions of the outcome of the annual Tennessee-Alabama 
football game. Many social issues of a more serious nan1re have been addressed 
as well, including drug use, teen pregnancy, AIDS, use of the Internet, violence, 
and pornography. The Tennessee Poll has also assessed public opinion on a fair-
ly large number of public policy issues, including questions involving criminal 
justice, health care policy, education, and welfare programs. Unfortunately, most 
of these questions were asked in only one or two polls, reflecting the constantly 
changing public dialog in the state and national media. 
Here we focus on five variables for which we have data over the entire time 
period: the matters of party identification, ideological self-identification, the 
state lottery, the state income tax, and abortion. The exact questions taken from 
the Tennessee Poll are contained in the appendix. Our selection of these ques-
tions is not dictated by convenience alone. As suggested above, partisanship and 
ideology are fundamental to any analysis of public opinion. The lottery, income 
tax, and abortion issues have been particularly salient in Tennessee politics over 
the last several years. While far from a complete mapping of the opinion land-
scape of the state, these data do provide a good sense of the opinion climate. To 
simplify the presentation as well as smooth out fluctuations due to sampling 
error, we have averaged the data by year. Thus we will be discussing eight points 
in time-each of the years from 1989 through 1996. 
TRENDS IN PARTISANSHIP 
In his 1949 classic Southern Politics, V. 0. Key remarked that "the forces of his-
tory ... may have destined Republicans to a minority position" in Tennessee pol-
itics.5 While that may have been true for many years after Key made his obser-
vation, the level of party competition in Tennessee has increased significantly 
over the last three decades. Until the early 1960s, Tennessee was a one party state 
in the tradition of the post-Civil War South. East Tennessee remained solidly 
Republican while the rest of the state was part of the "solid South" that delivered 
consistent Democratic victories statewide. This changed in the early sixties with 
the growth of a less traditional, more ideologically conservative Republican Par-
ty in the middle and western parts of the state. 
As the national Democratic Party moved to a more liberal position on social 
issues, especially civil rights, a grassroots conservatism developed in the South 
and elsewhere. This surge of conservatism helped the Republicans make a strong 
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comeback in the once "solid South." In Tennessee, this new life for the Repub-
licans led to the election of two senators, Howard Baker and Bill Brock, as well 
as to the first Republican Tennessee governor of the century, Winfield Dunn of 
Memphis. While the newly rejuvenated Republican Party has greatly invigorat-
ed political competition within the state, it has never matched the Democrats in 
organization or levels of mass voter identification. The East has remained the 
stronghold of the party, but that strength has not shown the ideological fervor 
that motivated many of the newer converts. Republicans in East Tennessee fol-
low a tradition of Republicanism dating back to the Civil War. The new Repub-
licans in the Middle and West were more likely to have had Democratic family 
roots and to find their partisanship grounded in ideological conservatism rather 
than in family or community tradition. 
The two facets of Tennessee Republicanism were very evident in the 1976 
Republican presidential primary. Gerald Ford came from the moderate wing of 
the party. After succeeding Richard Nixon in 197 4, he sought the nomination on 
his own. He was challenged by California Gov. Ronald Reagan, who was the 
candidate of the more conservative wing of the party. In the Republican prima-
ry, Reagan carried Middle and West Tennessee, while Ford won easily in the 
East. Tennessee had one Republican party, albeit one with a dual personality, but 
the G.O.P. was finally a force in Tennessee politics. 
During the 1980s, the Tennessee G.O.P. enjoyed some statewide success, 
most notably the election and reelection of Lamar Alexander as governor. Still, 
the Democrats won both U.S. Senate seats (Gore and Sasser) and continued to 
dominate the state legislature. However, the 1990s witnessed a dramatic 
upswing in the Republicans' electoral fortunes. By the end of 1994 the state 
once again had two Republican senators and a Republican governor. Moreover 
the Republicans also controlled the state Senate, leaving only the House of Rep-
resentatives and the soon to be abolished Public Service Commission controlled 
by the once dominant Democrats. Those developments, however, do not make 
certain the beginning of a new era of Republican dominance of state politics in 
Tennessee. In the 1996 elections, the partisan makeup of the U.S. House and 
Senate delegations remained unchanged, although Democrats won back control 
of the state Senate. 
The Tennessee Poll data on party identification suggest, at least in the near 
term, close competition and fairly regular swings in power between the parties. 
In 1981, UT-Chattanooga political scientist Robert Swansborough found that 
25 percent of Tennesseans identified with the Republican Party, although he 
noted that this level was substantially higher than in the South generally.6 Our 
data, which reflect the last eight years, indicate that Tennessee now possesses a 
ve1y competitive partisan environment. 7 On average, over the eight-year period, 
30 percent of those surveyed identified themselves as Republicans, as compared 
with 32 percent as Democrats and 38 percent as independents (see table 1). This 
level of Republican identification represents a significant increase over the 25 
percent level found by Swansborough in 1981, although it is still a long way from 
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Table 11.1 
TRENDS IN TENNESSEE PUBLIC OPINION, 1989-1996 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Avg. 
Party Identification 
Democrat 31% 32% 30% 31% 34% 35% 33% 31% 32% 
Independent 40% 41% 43% 39% 38% 33% 33% 36% 38% 
Republican 30% 27% 27% 30% 28% 32% 34% 33% 30% 
Ideology 
Liberal 15% 14% 17% 15% 12% 17% 17% 17% 16% 
Moderate 54% 51% 51% 50% 45% 38% 45% 43% 47% 
Conservative 31% 35% 32% 35% 43% 45% 38% 40% 37% 
State Lottery 
Favor 60% 62% 70% 70% 72% 71% 67% 68% 68% 
Not Sure 6% 6% 6% 8% 4% 6% 6% 7% 6% 
Oppose 34% 32% 24% 22% 24% 23% 27% 25% 26% 
State Income Tax 
Favor 30% 30% 34% 32% 31% 26% 31% 24% 30% 
Not Sure 11 % 12% 10% 10% 8% 15% 10% 11% 11 % 
Oppose 59% 58% 56% 58% 61% 59% 59% 65% 59% 
Abortion Law 
Easier 5% 7% 9% 7% 10% n/d 8% 5% 7% 
About Right 49% 50% 47% 49% 43% n/d 46% 50% 48% 
Harder 46% 43% 44% 44% 47% n/d 46% 45% 45% 
N ote: Data derived fi·om the Te11ne1see Poll conducted by the Social Science Research Institute at the University o[Tennessee, 
Knoxville, 1989- 1996. 
a majority. The independents, who number in the plurality, will dictate which 
party controls government. Thus, divided party government at the state level 
remains highly likely. 
In terms of mass party identification, Tennessee is reasonably consistent 
with the national picture. Using data collected by the General Social Survey and 
the National Election Study (see table 2), we estimate that over the 1989- 1994 
period, 30 percent of Americans identified as Republicans, 37 percent with the 
Democrats, and 33 percent as independents. Tennessee is therefore indistin-
guishable from the national environment with respect to the proportion of 
Republican identifiers. It differs slightly in that Tennesseans are a bit less likely 
to identify as Democrats and a bit more likely to identify as independents. 
Obviously, the elections of Republican Don Sundquist to the governorship 
and two Republicans, Bill Frist and Fred Thompson, to the U.S. Senate in 1994 
(as well as Thompson's re-election in 1996) demonstrate the viability of Repub-
licanism in Tennessee. The resurgence of the Republican Party is certainly not 
unique to Tennessee, as indicated by the Republican takeover of Congress in 
1994. Indeed, the shifting party loyalties of Tennesseans parallel what is hap-
pening throughout the South, as whites defect en masse from the Democratic 
Party. This development is obviously related to race, but it is also related to ide-
ology. In Tennessee, as throughout the South, many whites are apt to eschew a 
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Table 11.2 
NATIONAL TRENDS IN PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGY, 1989-1996 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Avg. 
Party Identification 
Democrat 38% 36% 36% 36% 35% 37% 42% 37% 
Independent 29% 32% 33% 39% 35% 35% 28% 33% 
Republican 33% 32% 31% 25% 30% 29% 30% 30% 
Ideology 
Liberal 28% 27% 28% 28% 27% 24% 26% 27% 
Moderate 39% 36% 40% 31% 37% 36% 30% 36% 
Conservative 33% 37% 32% 41% 36% 37% 44% 37% 
Nole: Theses data are derived ftom the Gweml Social Survey, except for 1992 and 1996, which are hased 011 I he National 
Election Studies conducled by lhe Cmter for Politiml S111dies at the University efMichign11. The NES data appear lo over-
state somewhat the proportion of romervatives nml 1111derstntc the proportion of Repuhlicnns. ThiJ iJ, 110 doubt, due to slight 
diffi!rcnce.r in iustrumenlntion between the CSS mu/ the NES. Still, the averngefar the eight-year period provides n reason-
able estimate of these parameters during this time-frame. 
Democratic Party that they perceive to be too liberal. Indeed, in our aggregated 
1989-1996 data, 63 percent of black respondents but only 28 percent of white 
respondents identified themselves as Democrats (see table 5) . Our additional 
research found that as a group, these white Democrats tend to be less well edu-
cated, less affluent, older citizens than whites identifying themselves as Republi-
cans or independents. They are also much more likely to be comfortable with the 
"liberal" label, which brings us to the next topic-ideology. 
TRENDS IN IDEOLOGICAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
While there are a number of ways to conceptualize ideological variation, the 
standard device is the liberal-conservative continuum that ranges from "very lib-
eral" or "extremely liberal" on the "far left" to "very conservative" or "extremely 
conservative" on the "far right."8 Viewing the liberal-conservative continuum 
more simply as a trichotomy (i.e., "liberal'', "moderate" and "conservative"), our 
data show that the proportion of liberals in Tennessee has remained fairly stable 
(and small) over the eight year period (see table 1).9 On average, only 16 percent 
of Tennesseans prefer the liberal moniker. This stands in sharp contrast to our 
national estimate in which 28 percent of Americans are identified as liberals for 
the entire time-frame. Our data suggest that, as with Democratic identifiers, lib-
erals in Tennessee tend to be less educated and less well-off than other citizens. 
Interestingly, our data suggest that while blacks are much more likely than whites 
to call themselves Democrats (63 percent to 28 percent), they are only marginal-
ly more likely than whites to self-identify as liberals (23 percent to 14 percent). 
The proportion of self-identified conservatives increased substantially 
throughout the eight-year period. Whereas in 1989 about 31 percent identified 
as conservatives, in 1994 the number grew dramatically to 45 percent. It then 
decreased significantly in 1995 to 38 percent, perhaps as a reaction to perceived 
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excesses of the national Republican agenda. In 1996, the proportion of conserv-
atives bounced back to 40 percent. The average for the entire period is 37 per-
cent, which is remarkably close to the national norm (see tables 1 and 2). 
The percentage of Tennesseans identifying themselves as moderates 
dropped significantly from 54 percent in 1989 to 38 percent in 1994. Of course, 
in that year, Tennesseans gave the Republicans huge electoral victories that 
helped the GOP take control of Congress. In 1995, Tennesseans appeared to 
pull back to the center. The proportion of moderates jumped from 38 percent 
to 45 percent. The proportion of conservatives dropped from 45 percent to 38 
percent (the proportion ofliberals remained constant at 17 percent). The 1996 
data do not reveal statistically significant differences in ideology and partisan-
ship from 1995. 
Averaging the data over time makes clear that Tennesseans are more likely 
than Americans generally to self-define as moderates (compare tables 1 and 2) . 
They are just about as likely as Americans generally to identify themselves as 
conservatives. But Tennesseans are considerably less likely to adopt the liberal 
label. Viewing the liberal-moderate-conservative trichotomy as an interval mea-
sure, one can clearly say that the central tendency of Tennesseans falls somewhat 
to the right of Americans generally. It would be fair to characterize the Ten-
nessee political environment as moderately conservative. This label is consistent 
with the observation that most, if not all, successful statewide Republican candi-
dates, including Lamar Alexander, Don Sundquist, Fred Thompson, and Bill 
Frist, have avoided making obvious appeals to the far right in their campaigns. 
THE STATE LOTTERY ISSUE 
In the late 1980s, Tennesseans became interested in the possibility of establish-
ing a state lottery to supplement or replace other sources of state revenue. As 
adjoining states like Georgia, Kentucky, and Virginia adopted lotteries, concern 
mounted that Tennessee was losing sales tax revenue as consumers near the bor-
ders crossed state lines to buy gasoline and groceries at stores where they could 
also purchase lottery tickets. Since 1989, the Tennessee Poll has included the fol-
lowing question: "Some have suggested a state lottery for Tennessee. How do 
you feel? Would you favor or oppose instituting a lottery in Tennessee?" The 
Tennessee Poll has consistently found high levels of public support for the lot-
tery. On average over the eight-year period, about two-thirds of respondents 
have indicated support for the concept; about one-quarter have expressed oppo-
sition. Opposition to the lottery is most intense among strong conservatives, the 
elderly, people who live in rural/farming areas, fundamentalist Protestants, and, 
interestingly, those with the highest levels of education. 
Despite strong public backing, there has been little movement in the Gen-
eral Assembly to enact a lottery for Tennessee. Many no doubt wonder how the 
status quo can remain intact in the face of tl1is much support for a change in pol-
,_ 
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icy. Most people are probably unaware that the state Constitution prohibits lot-
teries and that changing it is extremely difficult. However, in the 1994 legislative 
session a call for a state constitutional convention was almost approved. The 
major stumbling block came in the state Senate, where a number of senators 
based their opposition on their personal values. Most of these senators are 
unlikely to change their views, regardless of the degree of support for the lottery 
among their constituents. This reflects the traditional political culture still appar-
ent in Tennessee. The fact that the citizemy tolerates a few senators' ability to 
prevent a procedure to consider a policy favored by the majority underlines the 
deference to authority that is part of such a culture. 
THE STATE INCOME TAX 
In their seminal textbook Government in Tennessee, Greene, Grubbs, and Hob-
day remarked that "if controversies are lacking, a fight can always be stirred up 
on taxes."10 A long-standing question in this state has been whether to institute 
a personal income tax. Greene, et al. thought that "the insatiable demand for 
governmental expenditure" might lead to the adoption of such a tax, although 
they admitted that "by all signs it is unwelcome at present."11 Tennessee relies 
primarily on a very high sales tax to generate revenue. This system is often criti-
cized as regressive and unstable. At times, such as during Ned McWherter's sec-
ond term as governor, the issue has actually made it onto the public agenda, but 
never has an income tax proposal come anywhere close to being enacted. 
Governor McWherter had given many people reason to believe that he 
would aggressively support tax reform once he was elected to his second term. He 
had noted the unfairness in the highly regressive sales tax and the system's inabil-
ity to keep pace with economic growth. However, McWherter did not fully uti-
lize his political resources in seeking to bring about tax reform. Some observers 
believe that the only chance for a general state income tax would be to embed it 
in broad-based tax reform enthusiastically marketed by a popular political figure. 
McWherter never vigorously championed his proposals, and the window of 
political opportunity soon shut tight. In the increasingly antitax 1990s, serious 
consideration of an income tax by state politicians seems doubtful. In the 1994 
election for Governor, both Republican Don Sundquist and Democrat Phil Bre-
desen took firm stands against the income tax. 
While a substantial minority of Tennesseans favor a state income tax, the 
weight of public opinion is clearly on the other side (see table 1) . There appears 
to be very little prospect for change in the climate of opinion on this issue. 
Rather, any movement appears to be away from support for the income tax. As 
a policy issue, a state income tax may not yet be dead and buried, but it is clear-
ly "on life support." Although there is a viable, well-funded organization called 
Tennesseans for Fair Taxation that is committed to keeping the issue alive, most 
politicians in the state would be more than happy to "pull the plug." 
/ 
TENNESSEE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 
146 
THE ABORTION ISSUE 
h b 
. remains one of the most hotly contested policy issues on the 
Althoug a ort10n . 
. al the debate in Tennessee has not been nearly as contentious. The 
nation scene, . . . . . 
. h ot figured prominently in campaign rhetonc nor have antiabortion issue as n . . 
t 
·n Tennessee been charactenzed by the violence that other states have protes s i , . . ... 
. d Still an examination of Tennesseans views on th1s divisive national 
w1tnesse . , 
issue is warranted and revealing. . . 
As table 1 indicates, few Tennesseans ':'a~t getting a~ abortion made easier. 
A substantial minority, approaching a maJonty, would like to see them made 
harder to obtain. Does this mean that Tennesseans would support a fundamen-
tal change in policy on this issue? To test that ~ypothesis, ~e included the fol-
lowing question in the October 1995 survey: Do _you think that the United 
States Supreme Court shou.ld overtu~n o~ up~old its 19,?3 decision in Roe v . 
Wade which effectively legalized abort10n m this country? Although a substan-
tial minority (39 percent) favored overturning Roe, a greater percentage (49 per-
cent) preferred that the decision be upheld (12 percent were not sure).12 Like 
Americans generally, Tennesseans are troubled by the abortion issue and would 
like to see the number of abortions reduced, but most of them do not support a 
fundamental change in public policy in this area. 
In many ways Tennessee has been spared the most divisive political battles 
on the abortion front. While the pro-life ~ov~men_t has become increasingly 
active in attempting to elect lawmakers with like views, very few have taken 
office, despite the Republican electoral successes in recent years. Moreover, orga-
nizations such as Operation Rescue have not undertaken major efforts within our 
state. Perhaps the even split in public opinion, in a broader climate of more mod-
erate conservatism, has injected a bit of caution into the thinking of any politi-
cian risking alienating opponents on either side of the issue. 
IDEOLOGY, PARTISANSHIP AND POLICY ISSUES 
In Tennessee, as in national politics, ideology and party identification are defi-
nitely related, though they are far from synonymous. In our aggregated data, 49 
percent of the self-described liberals interviewed by the Tennessee Poll also 
described themselves as Democrats (see table 3). More than one-third of the lib-
erals (36 percent) preferred the "Independent" label. Similarly, only 42 percent of 
conservatives identified themselves as Republicans, with 33 percent of them pre-
ferring to cast themselves as independents. Looking at the relationship the oth-
er way, only 8 percent of Republicans describe themselves as liberals, whereas 24 
percent of Democrats espouse the liberal label. Not surprisingly, independents 
are most likely to self-define as moderates; moderates are most likely to identify 
themselves as independents. Ideological moderates are more likely to attach 
themselves to the Democrats than to the Republicans (32 percent to 24 percent), 
but independents are twice as likely to self-define as conservatives than as liber-
als (31 percent to 14 percent). 
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Table 11.3 
ISSUE POSITIONS BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND IDEOLOGY (1989- 96 aggregated) 
Democrat Independent Republican Liberal Moderate Conservative 
Party Identification 
Democrat 49% 32% 25% 
Independent 36% 45% 33% 
Republican 15% 24% 42% 
Ideology 
Liberal 24% 14% 8% 
Moderate 48% 55% 39% 
Conservative 28% 31% 53% 
State Lottery 
Favor 64% 64% 57% 73% 66% 54% 
Not Sure 6% 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 
Oppose 30% 31% 38% 23% 29% 41% 
State Income Tax 
Favor 35% 31% 27% 38% 33% 26% 
Not Sure 10% 9% 9% 8% 9% 9% 
Oppose 55% 60% 64% 54% 58% 65% 
Abortion Law 
Easier 13% 10% 7% 14% 11 % 7% 
About Right 50% 46% 39% 58% 51% 33% 
Harder 38% 44% 54% 28% 39% 60% 
Note: Data den'ved fro m the Tennessee Poll conducted by the Social Science Research Institute at the University ofTemzessee, 
K11oxvi/fe, March 1996. 
In terms of policy issues, Republicans and conservatives are much more like-
ly to favor toughening abortion laws. Both groups also manifest greater levels of 
opposition to the lottery and to the income tax. However, the relationship 
between ideology and the income tax issue is very weak, suggesting that ideolog-
ical orientations among Tennesseans today may have more to do with social and 
moral questions (e.g., gambling and abortion) than with pocketbook issues. 
REGIONALISM WITHIN THE STATE 
Students of state politics have for many years noted that Tennessee is divided 
into three grand divisions, each of which is culturally and politically distinctive. 
Our data suggest that regionalism is becoming less significant as a determinant 
of public opinion (see table 4). While it remains true that East Tennessee is the 
most Republican of the three grand divisions, the differences in partisan identi-
fication across the state are not that pronounced. The same is true of ideology. 
The East and Middle regions are identical; the West is slightly more conserva-
tive. The three regions are indistinguishable in terms of their collective senti-
ments regarding the lottery and are only marginally different on the abortion and 
income tax issues. It appears that the state's political culture, once regarded as tri-
partite in character, has become largely homogenized. 
.... -· 
... 
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Table 11.4 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION, IDEOLOGY, AND ISSUE POSITIONS BY REGION 
(1989-96 aggregated) 
East Tennessee Middle Tennessee West Tennessee 
Party Identification 
Democrat 27% 36% 37% 
Independent 41% 41% 35% 
Republican 33% 23% 29% 
Ideology 
Liberal 15% 16% 15% 
Moderate 49% 49% 46% 
Conservative 36% 36% 39% 
State Lottery 
Favor 62% 62% 62% 
Not Sure 6% 5% 6% 
Oppose 33% 33% 33% 
State Income Tax 
Favor 29% 32% 30% 
Not Sure 10% 10% 11 % 
Oppose 61% 58% 59% 
Abortion Law 
Easier 9% 10% 11 % 
About Right 43% 48% 44% 
Harder 47% 42% 46% 
Note: Data derived from the Tennessee Poll conducted by the Social Science Research !11stitule at the University ofTe1111essee, 
Knoxville, March 1996. 
RACE, GENDER, AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
Racial differences in American public opinion are well documented. Tennesseans 
are no exception. There are clear differences between Anglos and African Amer-
icans in Tennessee on all the variables included in this study (see table 5). By far 
the most pronounced racial differences are in the area of partisanship, with blacks 
more than twice as likely as whites to identify as Democrats and whites more 
than three times as likely as blacks to self-identify as Republicans. Blacks are also 
somewhat more likely to see themselves as liberals but, interestingly, almost as 
likely as whites to self-define as conservatives. On the lottery issue, there are no 
racial differences. On abortion, blacks are somewhat more likely to favor the pro-
choice position. As a group, blacks are significantly more supportive of institut-
ing a state income tax. 
Our data also reveal something of a "gender gap" in Tennessee with respect 
to party identification (see table 5). Women are significantly more likely to 
embrace the Democrats and slightly less likely to adhere to the Republican Par-
ty. In terms of ideology, women as a group are less conservative than are men, 
but the gap is fairly narrow here (indeed, it is within the margin of error and 
therefore may be a statistical artifact) . On the issues, there are some differences, 
but none are especially dramatic. 
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Table 11.5 
PARTISANSHIP, IDEOLOGY AND ISSUE POSITIONS BY RACE, GENDER 
AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, 1989-1996 (aggregated) 
Low Middle High 
Male Female White Black Income Income Income 
Party Identification 
Democrat 28% 36% 28% 63% 39% 29% 25% 
Independent 42% 37% 41% 27% 38% 41% 38% 
Republican 30% 27% 31% 11% 23% 31% 38% 
Ideology 
Liberal 14% 17% 14% 23% 17% 15% 14% 
Moderate 47% 49% 49% 42% 46% 51% 49% 
Conservative 39% 35% 37% 35% 37% 34% 38% 
State Lottery 
Favor 66% 59% 62% 62% 63% 65% 59% 
Not Sure 4% 6% 5% 5% 6% 4% 6% 
Oppose 30% 35% 33% 33% 32% 31% 35% 
State Income Tax 
Favor 31% 30% 29% 41% 31% 31% 31% 
Not Sure 7% 13% 10% 11% 13% 7% 7% 
Oppose 62% 57% 61% 49% 57% 62% 62% 
Abortion Law 
Easier 10% 10% 9% 15% 11% 10% 8% 
About Right 47% 43% 45% 44% 38% 48% 51% 
Harder 44% 47% 46% 42% 51% 42% 41% 
Note: (1) Data derived fiwn the Te1111mee Poll conducted by the Social Science Researc/; Justitule at the University of 
Tennessee, Knoxville, 1989-1996. (2) "low income" includes respo11de11ls w hose nmrnal household income is less than 
SJS,000; "middle income" includes respondeuls whose rmn1111/ howehold i11comc is between SJ 5,000 and $50,000; "high 
income" includes respontlents whose 1111111wl homehold income exceeds SS0,000. 
Finally, we come to socioeconomic status (see table 5). As we noted earlier, 
there is a relationship between income and party identification. In keeping with 
conventional wisdom, Democrats are, on average, less well off than Republicans. 
This difference in partisanship does not translate into dramatic ideological dif-
ferences across income levels, however. Low-income, middle income, and high 
income Tennesseans do not differ very much when it comes to the three issues 
either. Of course, one might posit other issues beyond the scope of this study on 
which dramatic differences would emerge. 
CONCLUSION 
Tennessee politics has become more competitive over the last half century. Pub-
lic opinion data collected over the last eight years paint a picture of a state whose 
electorate may be flirting with a switch to a period of Republican dominance. 
But, as of 1996, the Democrats remain competitive. 
Tennesseans have cemented their opposition to an income tax and have con-
cretized their support for a lottery, but they remain sharply divided on abortion. 
Remarkable consistency characterizes the latter two issues. No definitive evi-
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dence yet exists to indicate whether Tennessee voters will continue a more con-
servative, Republican drift, and whether this drift will lead to a more conflictual 
political environment, especially concerning the abortion issue. In terms of the 
state's political culture, our data suggest that differences among the state's tradi-
tional divisions may be disappearing. Indeed, in many ways Tennessee's political 
culture is increasingly reflective of the nation as a whole. Just as regionalism 
within the state is becoming less of a factor, regionalism around the country like-
wise appears to be diminishing. As more and more political communication is 
nationally based, we would expect these trends to continue. 
